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The nature of global environmental risks (e.g. climate change) are often complex and thereby 
difficult to understand through human sensory reception. The perception of these risks will 
therefore often come from communications from experts and the public discourse. How 
people evaluate this communication, and how they act in associated decision-making 
processes are crucial because is leads to environmentally relevant behaviour. The present 
study examined the effect of framing (psychological distance and moral responsibility) of 
messages about environmental risks on environmentally relevant policy support. Using an 
experimental design, 183 participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions in 
two fictitious environmental risk scenarios: a local risk with a focus on collective moral 
responsibility (N= 32), a global risk with a focus on collective moral responsibility (N = 53), a 
local risk with an individual focus on moral responsibility (N = 52), or a global risk with a 
focus on individual moral responsibility (N = 49). The results showed no effect of framing on 
policy support, but all the included types of policy supports were predictable from values 
(biospheric, altruistic and egoistic) and emotions (ethic related and consequence related). This 
indicates that framing of the type used in this experiment, do not affect people’s moral 
considerations in relation to environmental risk related policies.   
 









Globale miljørisikoer er ofte komplekse av natur, og følgelig vanskelige å forstå gjennom 
menneskelig persepsjon. Oppfatningen av denne type risiko vil derfor ofte komme fra 
kommunikasjon fra eksperter og den offentlige diskurs. Hvordan folk evaluerer denne 
kommunikasjonen, og hvordan de responderer i tilknyttede beslutningsprosesser er 
avgjørende fordi det fører til ulike typer miljøatferd. Dette studiet undersøkte effekten av 
innramming (psykologisk avstand og moralsk ansvar) av budskap om miljørisiko på 
miljøpolitisk støtte. Gjennom å bruke et eksperimentelt design, ble 183 deltakere tilfeldig 
tildelt én av fire scenario i to ulike fiktive miljørisikoscenarier: en lokal risiko med fokus på 
kollektivt moralsk ansvar (N = 32), en global risiko med fokus på kollektivt moralsk ansvar 
(N = 53), en lokal risiko med et individuelt fokus på moralsk ansvar (N = 52), eller en global 
risiko med fokus på individuelt moralsk ansvar (N = 49). Resultatene viste ingen innvirkning 
av innramming på politisk støtte, men alle inkluderte typer miljøpolitisk støtte var mulig å 
predikere gjennom verdier (biosfæriske, altruistiske og egoistiske) og emosjoner (etisk 
relaterte og konsekvens relaterte). Dette indikerer at innramming av typen som ble brukt i 
dette eksperimentet, ikke påvirker folks moralske hensyn i forhold til ulike typer miljøpolitisk 
støtte. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION, FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
Introduction 
 Global environmental problems and climate change are some of the biggest threats 
humanity is facing. Human impact on the natural environment, such as increased CO2-
emissions, challenges our livelihoods (IPCC, 2014). Due to an increase in average 
temperatures, sea level rise and extreme drought, consequences for both the ecology, 
economy and public health will be severe (National Research Council, 2010). In the Paris 
agreement, 175 countries have agreed to aim at keeping the global temperature rise this 
century well below 2 degrees Celsius (above pre-industrial levels), preferably further to 1,5 
degrees Celsius (Morgan, Dagnet & Tirpak, 2014). During the last two decades, possible 
solutions to better mitigate and adapt to environmental risks, have been heavily debated in the 
public discourse, as well as in the social and natural sciences.  
 The need for a transition from fossil energy dependence is clearly present, considering 
that it is the biggest source of CO2 emissions on earth today (Metz, Davidson, De Coninck, 
Loos, & Meyer, 2005). Policies that are needed to reach the goals of the Paris agreement and 
change the energy system are, in addition to research and innovation, dependent on public 
support and engagement. It the context of policy support, framing (filters) of communications 
concerning environmental risks is an unavoidable reality, as our evaluations and decisions 
never are formed or drawn in a vacuum (Nisbet, 2009). A central questions when 
communicating environmental risks is: who is causing the risks and who will suffer the 
consequences? Within psychology there is literature arguing that people`s moral 
considerations, as well as emotional reactions and personal values, are very important in the 
evaluation of responsibility in climate and environmental contexts (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 
1993; Groot & Steg, 2007). In addition, there is evidence showing that the complex structure 
of environmental risk may prevent people from detecting the causal structure, and thereby not 
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evaluate environmental risks as a moral imperative. Thus, it is reasonable to look closer at the 
psychology behind human perception, evaluation and behaviour connected to environmental 
risk. Exploring the communicational triggers for specific policy support could in turn 
contribute to better the communication of environmental issues.   
 Research shows that despite an increasing amount of evidence indicating increased 
environmental risk caused by anthropogenic environmental changes over the last decades, the 
overall public concern and perceived importance of these issues have in many countries 
declined (Pidgeon, 2012). This is particularly the case in wealthy western countries (Kohut, 
2013). In the context of climate change, some call this the ‘climate paradox’ (Stoknes, 2014; 
Nordgaard, 2011), and this could be considered an example of moral failure. The discrepancy 
between the increased scientific knowledge and decreased public concern has been 
investigated through a large amount of psychological literature (Swim et al., 2011; Sterman, 
2008; Weber, 2006; Doherty & Cayton, 2011). Some would claim that environmental risks, 
like climate change, can be challenging for our moral judgement systems to fully understand 
and engage in. As a result, we might evaluate environmental risks morally different than for 
example terror, fraud, or forced marriage (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). Böhm and Pfister 
(2000; 2005; 2017) proposes a model that seeks to investigate how people evaluate 
environmental risks. The model includes both moral, cognitive and emotional components, 
and forms the basis of a mental model approach. This model is helpful when trying to 
understand why people perceive and evaluate environmental risks the way they do, because it 
looks at causal evaluation with a step-by-step approach.  
 Two aspects that have been proposed as potential barriers for the moral activation 
when evaluating environmental risks is the lack of communicated risk proximity and a clear 
moral responsibility (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Markowitz, 2012b; Gardiner 2006; 
Jamieson, 2007). This thesis will use experimental methods to explore participant`s risk 
3 
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perception and policy evaluation when exposed to different framings of distance and moral 
responsibility in environmental risks scenarios. The prediction is that it is possible to trigger 
people's moral thinking in such a way that it is reflected in specific political support. In 
addition to this, emotional reactions and personal values will be examined as possible 
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Theoretical and Empirical Foundations 
 This section will give an overview of the existing literature that is relevant for this 
thesis. It will start by looking at why morality is central to environmental risk perception and 
evaluation. This is followed by an overview of environmental risk characteristics, which will 
clarify the psychological complexity of environmental risks and how this relates to distance 
and morality. Further, the process of environmental risk perception and evaluation will be 
explored through the mental model approach. Finally, this is followed by an introduction to 
human values, and its importance in understanding moral responsibility in conjunction with 
risk perception and evaluation. In this thesis, climate and environmental issues will be used 
without major differentiation. Most of the literature about the psychological aspects of climate 
change is applicable when talking about environmental risks in general.  
 
 Morality. 
 Haidt (2001) states that morality is the driver to human (social) behaviour, and that the 
way we interpret and evaluate potential moral issues in conjunction with environmental risks 
are crucial (Haidt, 2001; Sjöberg, 2000; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Böhm & Pfister, 2000, 
2005). For several moral philosophers, environmental issues, like climate change, are to be 
considered a fundamentally moral issue (Jamieson, 2010; Singer, 2006; Gardiner 2006). This 
is because of the negative outcomes climate change will have for humans and animals, and 
because the earth`s atmosphere, that provides us with ‘life sustaining services’ and therefore 
considered a public good, has limited resources (Singer, 2006). In addition to this, Jamieson 
(2010) highlights the moral aspect of injustice, stating that the rich take more of the global 
public goods than the poor, and harm the poor additionally by contributing to global change 
(which in the main will affect the poorest parts of the world). Haidt (2001) supports the 
assumption that environmental issues are a morally laden problem, by emphasizing how 
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moral intuitions and emotions become intertwined when attitudes are anchored in moral 
thinking. This is because humans seem to have an innate disposition to care deeply about right 
and wrong, and thereby about other people`s intentions. The visceral responses that often 
occur when faced with attitudes that challenge one’s own view in conjunction with moral 
judgements, further supports this (Damasio, as sited in Forgas, 2012; Greene & Haidt, 2002).  
 It has been shown that morality influences political attitudes (Emler, 2003), but also 
people`s attitudes and behaviour connected to climate change (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, 
& Kalof, 1999; Markowitz, 2012b). Studies that empirically combine these assumptions find 
that individuals that consider the ethical implications in environmental risks show greater 
support for pro-environmental policies (Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, & Dietz, 2010; Skitka, 2010, 
Markowitz, 2010a). There is also evidence from neuropsychological studies using FMRI 
showing that moral judgements correlate with different patterns of neural activity in 
emotionally related brain areas and therefore to the characteristics of the situation that people 
evaluate (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Böhm and Pfister (2001) 
suggests that evaluation of risks that includes a consideration of potential harm to others, is 
highly relevant when talking about cognitive evaluation of environmental risks. These 
judgements clearly involve subsequent emotional reactions, which is something Böhm and 
Pfister point out as a very important factor in their work connected to environmental risk 
evaluation (Böhm & Pfister, 2001; Böhm 2005).  
 From the above findings, I derive that there seems to be a connection between the 
perception of climate change as caused by humans, and corresponding ethical considerations. 
The mapping of what or who is causing a risk, and what or who suffers the consequences, that 
some researchers call ‘the causal structure’ (Böhm & Pfister, 2001; Bostrom, 2017), appears 
somewhat to be a key factor for human ethical evaluation for environmental risks. However, it 
is important to have in mind that environmental risks are highly complex by nature, among 
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other things because of its social dilemma structure and aggregated causation (Böhm and 
Pfister, 2000).  
 
 Environmental risk characteristics. 
  In the following section, I will describe the difference between a risk and a perceived 
risk, followed by some selected characteristics of environmental risks. The highlighted 
characteristics are relevant for this thesis, because they are empirically shown to affect the 
perception and evaluation of moral responsibility of environmental risks. The term risk is 
traditionally used to describe an event, situation or activity that involves (a) a degree of loss 
(of something humans value) and (b) a degree of uncertainty of an outcome (Slovic, 1997). 
Risk perception, on the other hand, is the subjective evaluation of risk, which involves a 
personal assessment of the severity and characteristics of a risk. Supporting evidence shows 
that while risk is related to beneficial outcomes (e.g. financial decisions) in the world, in 
people`s minds and judgements, a risk is related to negative outcomes (e.g. low risk is 
associated with high benefits and vice versa) (Slovic & Peters, 2006). Research within the 
field of cognitive psychology also shows that risk perception is influenced by heuristics and 
biases, like the affect heuristic (Zajonc, 1980). This means that people not only judge a risk 
based on what they think about it, but also how they feel about it (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). These finding show that the term risk often used by laypeople as 
something dangerous and harmful, largely is due to social factors (such as social norms), the 
media (Böhm & Pfister, 2008), but also emotional reactions (Slovic & Peters, 2006).  
 According to the field of risk perception, it seems as if people judge problems that 
they perceive to possess an immediate effect on their everyday life, as more severe than for 
long-term problems that happen far away (Koger & Winter, 2011). Additionally, a study by 
Böhm and Pfister (2001) showed that lay people associate global environmental risks with 
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negative consequences (loss) for humans, which also was evaluated as worse than negative 
consequences for nature (Böhm & Pfister, 2005). To get a better understanding of why these 
judgements occur, one could look closer at the structure of environmental risks. 
 Environmental risks tend to be complex by nature, and not easily comparable with 
other risks. A subject of interest for risk researchers within psychology, has been the scope of 
environmental risks (Pawlik, 1991; Klöckner, 2011; Koger & Winter, 2011). Climate change 
is an example of an environmental risk with a large scope, and because of the extraordinary 
character and complexity, people lack experience in dealing with it (Nordgaard, 2011). As a 
result, people may have the same “numbing” experience of dealing with climate change in the 
same way as is described about nuclear power: “being haunted by something we cannot see or 
even imagine” (Lifton, 1982). The discrepancy between personal resources (both emotional 
and cognitive) and the scope of this risk, is large and hard for people to deal with. This may 
lead to emotional reactions like the feeling of hopelessness or helplessness, or even anger and 
fear (Markowitz and Sheriff, 2012). This very same mechanism can also be used to explain 
why some people are in denial of environmental risks like climate change (Nordgaard, 2011). 
Because of the scope and complexity, environmental risks may provoke a self-defensive bias 
(Moser, 2010). This bias could be due to the public discourse that tends to tell people that 
their consumption and way of living is what is causing environmental damage, and may 
further provoke the feeling of guilt (or other negative emotions). As a consequence, this might 
lead to non-ameliorative reactions like the focus of costs of mitigation (Markowitz & Shariff, 
2012; Doherty & Cayton, 2011). In fact, recent findings suggest that those most responsible 
for a great share of the harmful global effects are the people that would actively try to avoid 
feeling responsible for causing climate change. They do this in part by blaming others for 
their contributions and inaction to the problem (Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan, & Jaeger, 2001; 
Nordgaard, 2011; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). This is problematic because it might hinder 
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pro-environmental action. Research focusing on scope and the defensive bias response are 
relevant in the context of the environment and morality, as it contributes to the scientific 
understanding of both the climate paradox, rejection of climate change, and non-
environmentally friendly actions (e.g. increased personal consumption). 
 Another feature characterizing environmental risks is the social dilemma structure 
(Vlek, 1996). A social dilemma structure, entails that while individual members of a group 
may have an incentive to follow an immediate personal interest (e.g. drive a car), it might not 
be beneficial for the group as a whole (humanity) in the long run (e.g. increased CO2 
emissions resulting in extreme weather). At the same time, if all cooperate, then all will 
benefit (Dawes and Messick, 2000). Based on the social dilemma structure, an environmental 
risk will, in some way, require a solution that does not necessarily satisfy the individual (e.g. 
stop driving a car), but that would be best to do based on ethical considerations (Böhm & 
Pfister, 2000). This idea also indicates that social belongingness is central in the context of 
risk perception, as in being close to or far away from where the environmental risk exhibits its 
consequences.  
 Even though climate change is the direct result of goal-directed behaviour (because 
nearly all activities that emit greenhouse gases are due to consumption or production of goods 
and services requested by humans), studies show that people often perceive these actions as 
unintentional (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). This is possibly because (1) it is hard to detect a 
single agent (or even several) who may be responsible for the risky development and (2) 
people don`t judge others to hold a lifestyle that causes harm intentionally (Pawlik, 1991; 
Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). Since unintentionally caused harms are judged less harshly than 
intentional ones, this might weaken the moral judgement of these types of risks (Markowitz & 
Shariff, 2012; Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009). These mechanisms have been explained 
on the basis of that environmental risks are often a result of the aggregated actions of many 
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people (Böhm & Pfister, 2001). The numbing and non-engaging notion of not knowing who is 
responsible for pollution or contamination can be prevented by clarifying who has done what 
and with what consequences.  
 Another feature of environmental risks, is psychological distance. A recognizable 
argument is that many people express a sense of distance to cause and/or consequences in 
connection with environmental risks (Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012). According to the 
Construal Level Theory (CLT), developed by Liberman and Trope (2008), there are four 
types of psychological distance: a geographical distance to the problem, a social distance 
(hard to culturally identifying with the people who suffer the consequences, because they 
often live far away) and a temporal distance (the long time-horizons, e.g. future temperature 
rise that will affect future generations). The CLT proposes that psychological distance is 
mentally represented in people`s minds in a way that is directly linked with the psychological 
distance to an object or event. Distant events or objects are mentally represented with abstract, 
decontextualized, high-level construals, while proximal events or objects are represented with 
low-level, concrete, and detailed construals. Furthermore, the theory imposes that the 
psychologically proximal and distant objects (or events) are represented in the similar mental 
space in people`s minds. This means that because each dimension of distance in interrelated, 
impact on one aspect of distance will influence the other (Liberman and Trope, 2008). 
Experimental studies show that when you ask people to focus on stimuli that is congruent 
(e.g. temporal uncertainty) with psychological distance (e.g. geographical distance), this will 
facilitate the processing of information given about the psychologically distant stimuli 
because they are cognitively associated (Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007). The 
decontextualized representation of psychological distance also influences the ability of 
performing abstraction tasks (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004), in the same way that the 
focus on psychological proximity improves the performance of tasks that requires focus on 
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specific details (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). 
 For geographical distance, environmental risk studies have found that by highlighting 
a local focus to an environmental risk, emotional and cognitive engagement will arise 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). This is explained as being due to the increased experience of 
salience (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Research also shows that people who experience phenomena 
(e.g. floods) that they attribute to climate change, show increased perception of personal and 
local risk from climate change, as well as higher levels of concern and worry (Reser, Bradley, 
Glendon, Elul, & Callaghan, 2012; Akerlof,  Maibach, Fitzgerald, Cedeno, & Neuman, 2013) 
  Based on the presented literature, I draw the assumptions that there are characteristics 
about environmental risks that are important to consider when trying to understand people`s 
emotional reactions, evaluations, and behaviours in relation to them. I interpret two 
components as being of special importance: (1) perceived risk severity (what is at stake), and 
(2) the ethicality (who is responsible), which is supported by cognitive risk researchers like 
Böhm and Pfister (2001). In conjunction with the literature on psychological distance, I see a 
need for communicating environmental risks at a more local level to reduce the perception of 
scope (and thereby the social distance), and thereby increase a sense of severity and urgency. 
This will in turn promote moral considerations when evaluating environmental risks. My 
conclusion further indicates that the manipulation and framing of these components might be 
crucial.  
 
 Environmental risk evaluation.  
 To better understand the process of perception and evaluation of global environmental 
risks, Böhm and Pfister (2000; 2005) suggests a mental model approach. This type of 
approach is very helpful when looking at risk evaluation and moral responsibility, because it 
tells us what people see as cause and effect (which lays the foundation for moral judgements) 
11 
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and could potentially determine people`s action tendencies. This approach is also a useful tool 
when looking for framing effects in environmental risk evaluation, because it provides a 
framework for looking at causal evaluation with a step-by-step approach.  
 The model from Böhm and Pfister (2000; 2005) includes both moral, cognitive and 
emotional components. As Figure 1 shows, the model assumes that the starting point of an 
environmental risk, is a mental representation (mental model) of the risk situation. A mental 
model is a representation or a set of causal beliefs which occurs when people perceive the 
surrounding world (Bostrom, 2017). A person`s mental model can influence how the person 
learns, reacts to information, defines a problem, and makes decisions (Gentner & Stevens, 
2014). Previous research on mental models and environmental risk perception suggests that 
the way people perceive and understand things like the climate system, shapes their beliefs 
and evaluations of environmental risk (Böhm & Pfister, 2001; Morgan, 2002; Sterman, 2008; 
Bostrom, 2017). The relationship between smoking and cancer has been used as an analogy to 
the phenomena of mental models (Newell & Pitman, 2010). Many would probably agree that 
it would be hard to explain the relationship with all the medical technical steps. At the same 
time, the fragmented knowledge about the relationship is sufficient to represent the risk in our 
minds. This is similar to the fragmented knowledge about the relationship between the 
increasing atmospheric CO₂ leading to global temperature rise, and the threat this temperature 
rise will impose. 
12 




Fig. 1. Dual-Process model of risk evaluation (Böhm & Pfister, 2017). 
 
 Norman (as sited in Bostrom, 2017) proposes four elements of mental model research 
that, put in the context of environmental risk perception, looks like this: (1) the target system 
(in this context that would be an environmental risk like climate change), (2) a conceptual 
model of the target system (a representation of the system of different concepts that are 
involved in the process of climate change), (3) the user`s mental model of this target system, 
and the (4) the researcher`s conceptualization of the user`s mental model. This framework 
shows how the mental models of lay people are subject to interpretation from the researcher, 
due to their abstract nature. Yet, an international study focusing on mental models showed 
that perceived risk and causality of climate change corresponds with the support of different 
policy alternatives (Bostrom et.al., 2012). For example, people who think that carbon 
emissions are the cause of environmental harm, tend to support policies that focus on reducing 
carbon emissions, because they think of this as the most effective policy. Despite the 
researcher's defining role, this study shows the importance of studying mental models because 
it proves that people support what they think is efficient by relying on a perceived causal 
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structure of an environmental risk. This is very important to consider in a climate policy 
context because it shows that even though climate change is overall a perceived risk, it is the 
causal thinking that guides the support for the various policies.  
 Through their model, Böhm and Pfister (2000; 2005) argue that when forming a 
mental representation of a risk, there are two evaluative aspects that are relevant: 
deontological evaluations and consequentialist evaluations. These two aspects involve 
specific cognitive evaluations, emotions, and different types of action tendencies (Böhm & 
Pfister, 2001) (See Fig.1). The consequentialist way of evaluation refers to consequences of 
potential loss, where the seriousness and uncertain negative consequences that might occur, 
will be weighed. Note that this type of focus also includes the evaluation of experienced 
outcomes, that refers to the ongoing processes of pollution and destruction, and negative as 
well as positive consequences (Böhm, 2003). The deontological way of evaluation, on the 
other hand, is about the ethical considerations of the actions themselves being more important 
than the consequences of actions. This mode of evaluation focuses more upon the potential 
violation of moral principles, and the focus therefore lies on the actors and the actions. This is 
related to what Baron and Spranca (1997) would call protected values. Their research 
indicates that people evaluate some actions to violate values that can`t be traded off. For 
example, people will not let natural resources be destroyed or let people die for monetary 
gains. This is considered taboo and will elicit emotions like anger and rage (Böhm & Pfister, 
2009). 
 As Figure 1 also shows, the model also includes an emotional aspect. Frijda (1986) 
claims that emotions have a guiding effect on action, and different psychological theorists 
have tried to clarify the role of affect in environmental risk perception (Nerb & Spada, 2001; 
Böhm & Pfister, 2000; Swim et al., 2011). It is an old assumption that emotions have a 
negative impact on decisions (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2012), and even though there is 
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conflicting evidence, emotions seem nevertheless to be helpful for decision making (e.g. 
Damasio, as sited in Forgas, 2012). Some would claim that it is separate systems that work 
independently (Zajonc, 1984), while others would say that emotions include some sort of 
cognitive appraisal (Lazarus, 1982), which is the assumption of the presented model of Böhm 
and Pfister (2000; 2005). Either way, because a perceived risk is associated with negative 
emotional reactions, the valence of emotional stimuli is important for how we further 
experience and evaluate risk (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). This was shown 
in a study where people were induced with negative emotions, whereupon the overall 
experience of risk would increase (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). In addition, Meijnders, 
Midden, and Wilke (2001) showed that by inducing fear through a short emotional film about 
climate change, participants were more willing to lower their energy consumption.  
 Nevertheless, Böhm & Pfister`s (2008) research supports a much broader and 
multifunctional view on emotions. As outlined in their model, different emotions with the 
same valence can have different functions in a decision-making process. This highlights the 
importance of nuance when looking for effects of (or on) emotions. Böhm and Pfister`s model 
(2000; 2005) implies that cognitions precede different emotional responses, and that these 
emotions in turn will affect the person`s behavioural tendencies in an environmental risk 
context. In a study from 2003, Böhm analysed the emotional reactions to different 
environmental risks, using the model by Böhm and Pfister (2000; 2005). Participants were 
presented with environmental risks scenarios, which afterwards had to indicate how strongly 
they experienced different emotions. The result confirmed the model`s distinction between the 
two different types of emotions: ethic-based and consequence-based. The first type, ethic-
based emotions, includes emotions like disgust, anger, disappointment, guilt or shame. These 
emotions are motivated seemingly by the participants judgement that there have been 
violations of ethical principles. The consequence-based emotions are motivated by evaluating 
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(past or future) consequences. Supporting evidence show that anger and fear are both negative 
emotions, but while fear tends to result in helping behaviour, anger will cause a more 
aggression related behaviour (Böhm & Pfister 2000; Nerb & Spada, 2001). 
 When considering the role of emotions in an environmental risk context, Böhm (2003) 
further differentiate between two types of the suggested emotional modes: (1) prospective 
(anticipated), (2) retrospective (experienced) consequence-based emotions, (3) other- and (4) 
self-related ethics-based emotions. Her research shows that people seem to experience more 
of emotions like fear and worry when they think about things that might happen (1), and 
emotions like sadness or sympathy when evaluating events that already had taken place (2). 
The latter distinctions (3, 4) indicate that based on who is responsible for the risk (the 
individual or the collective), people experience different emotions. If one feels self-blame, 
emotions like shame and guilt arise, while emotions like anger and outrage occur if somebody 
else seems guilty of causing the risk. Based on an emotion intensity rating, results from the 
study by Böhm (2003), showed that prospective consequence-based emotions were rated to be 
the strongest, while ethic-based self-directed emotions were the weakest. Another study, by 
Harth, Leach, and Kessler (2013) also show that the feeling of anger and guilt would be 
elicited when participants is being told that they had the personal responsibility for 
environmental damage. The feeling of guilt would further predict behavioural intentions that 
concern the repairing of environmental damage, whereas anger would predict intentions 
involved around punishment. 
 As Figure 1 shows, the way in which the evaluative focus triggers both emotional 
reactions and actions tendencies is consistent with the mode of the evaluation. A 
deontological evaluation (e.g. oil spill) will trigger moral judgements (e.g. a company is to 
blame), that also trigger morality-oriented emotions (e.g. outrage). This may result in agent 
related behaviour (e.g. vote for a party who will punish companies who pollute). Bostrom 
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(2017) further supports the assumption that causality is linked to the presentation of 
characteristics of risks, by referring to a study by McDaniels, Axelrod, and Slovic (1996). The 
results showed that deforestation was evaluated as more risky than global warming, and that 
energy production was viewed as less risky than both global warming and energy production. 
This shows that separate human activities are perceived as less risky than the actual 
consequences (pollution and emissions). This was further supported through a study by Böhm 
and Pfister (2005) that investigated the foundations for their dual-process model. By using a 
distinction between consequences for humans at the one hand, and consequences for the 
natural environment on the other hand, they found that risk types that involve negative 
consequences for humans were perceived riskier than risk types that affect only nature. 
 What I specifically draw from review on emotion is that the emotional reactions in 
some risk literature might lack nuance (Böhm, 2003), and therefore needs to be investigated 
more thoroughly by using different emotions of the same valence. That is because the 
different emotions are considered important factors in risk judgement and behaviour, that 
again are closely connected to moral consideration and behaviour (Böhm, 2003; Nerb & 
Spada, 2001; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013). The assumption that there are two emotion 
types (consequence based and ethic based emotions) that show different types of action 
tendencies, emphasizes this connection even further (Böhm & Pfister, 2000). Another 
conclusion would be that the specific emotions that could play a motivating role in getting 
people to think of environmental risk as something that is threatening to themselves and that 
they are responsible for causing (e.g. guilt), might seem hard to activate (Böhm, 2003). I 
would argue that this is connected to the perceived direction of the relationship between 
environmental risk and certain emotions. This perception seems to depend on the person’s 
knowledge about the risk. In addition to this, the distinction of consequence based and ethic 
based emotions probably would play an important role in environmental risk evaluation when 
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exposed to certain framings, as previously shown by Harth, Leach, and Kessler (2013). I 
interpret the above findings to be closely related to specific contextual factors, including 
framing, which is possible to manipulate for communicational purposes. An interesting 
question to ask when considering morality, framing effects, and the structure of mental 
models, is whether people will respond to environmental risks differently when risk is framed 
as something caused by one as an individual or the world community. It is plausible that 
manipulated information about agency will result in different outcome measures, when the 
risk is being presented with a clear causal structure indicating a detectable moral 
responsibility.  
 
 Responsibility.  
 In the further search for risk research that can explain what triggers the feeling of 
personal moral responsibility when evaluating an environmental risk, frameworks within the 
value theory domain offers useful input. Personal values are shown to be indirectly related to 
pro-environmental behaviour (Stern, 2000). Schwartz defines a value as “a desirable trans-
situational goal varying in importance, which serves as a guiding principle in the life of a 
person or other social entity” (1992, p. 21). Schwartz’s conceptualization of values is a good 
way at looking at broad subdivisions of different values connected to pro-environmental 
attitudes and actions. His 56 universal values can be placed into a two-dimensional space, 
where the values that are close to each other in the circumplex are compatible. The two 
dimensions are: self-transcendence (which includes altruism, forgiveness, loyalty) vs. self-
enhancement (which includes power, ambition and hedonism), and openness to change 
(which includes self-direction and stimulation) vs. conservation (which includes security, 
conformity and tradition). 
 Despite the strong position that Schwartz has in conceptualizing human values in 
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social psychology (Corner, Marowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014), there are other researchers that have 
developed scales which have proven useful in an environmental risk context. There are three 
types of values that seem to play an important role when looking for environment relevant 
behaviour tendencies (Stern, Dietz & Kalof, 1993; De Groot & Steg, 2007): altruistic values, 
biospheric values and egoistic values. Based on Schwartz`s values system, the values reflect 
the distinction between self-transcendence and self-enhancement dimension. The altruistic 
and biospheric values are represented in the self-transcendence dimension (e.g. universalism) 
and the egoistic values in the self-enhancement dimension (e.g. power). Even though altruistic 
and biospheric values, unsurprisingly enough, are highly correlated, the difference between 
altruistic values and biospheric values is that the first reflects a special concern for human 
welfare, while the latter one reflects a concern for the nature and environment. Egoistic values 
in this context reflects the self-interest connected to environmental protection. A well-known 
example here is the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) statement, where environmental concern 
increases when threat to one self or one’s family is recognized (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). 
Several studies support the use of and the distinction between altruistic values, biospheric 
values, and egoistic values by showing that pro-environmental attitudes and actions often are 
higher for people that show higher scores on self-transcendence oriented values, compared to 
self-enhancement oriented values (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003). 
 An example of a theory that explores this relationship between these values types and 
environmental behaviour, is the Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN), which is an extension of 
The Norm Activation Theory (NAT) by Schwartz (1977). Put simply, NAT proposes that pro-
environmental actions follow from the activation of personal norms because it reflects the 
feeling of moral obligation to act in a certain way. This activation is due to the following 
situational factors: (1) the awareness of the problem (what are the consequences of not 
19 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION, FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
acting), (2) the feeling of responsibility as a result of being aware of the negative 
consequences, (3) the identification of actions to reduce environmental problems and (4) 
one`s ability to contribute to hinder the negative consequences. The VBN theory (Stern et al. 
1999; Stern, 2000) serves as an extension to the NAT theory, by assuming that these 
situational factors additionally are dependent on personal values, which include biospheric 
values, altruistic values and egoistic values. This means that these values are activated in 
people who believe that environmental issues pose a threat to the biosphere, to people and 
species, and one self. Thus, the theory implies that the strength of this activation will 
determine further assessment of moral responsibility concerning pro-environmental actions. 
Empirical evidence shows that every variable in the VBN model is significantly related to the 
next variable in the causal chain. Only the biospheric values were directly related to the sense 
of obligation to act pro-environmental, when other variables were controlled for. This implies 
that biospheric values have great explanatory power in the context of environmental risk 
evaluation. Supporting evidence for the VBN theory comes from studies that have focused on 
a variety of general pro-environmental actions (e.g. Nordlund & Garvill, 2002), and som more 
specific, like explaining environmental citizenship (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 
1999), acceptability of various energy policies influencing households (Steg, Dreijerink ,& 
Abrahamse, 2005), willingness to reduce car use (Nordlund & Garvill, 2003), and policy 
acceptability (Eriksson, Garvill & Nordlund, 2006, 2008).  
 Further studies show that people may react negatively when asked to make choices 
that includes moral considerations, such as “putting a price” on nature (Tetlock, 2003). This is 
most likely due to the individual evaluation that some values are more important than others. 
Our values seem to be organized in a system where competing choices are based on the most 
important values (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). Both biospheric values and altruistic values tend 
to be positively related to pro-environmental behaviour, but when people are forced to choose 
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between the two, the difference between altruistically and biospherically oriented people 
becomes apparent (De Groot & Steg, 2008; Stern, 2000). As mentioned when describing the 
VBN theory, different situations can activate specific values when the situation is relevant for 
a value that is central to our self-concept. This means that situations can trigger specific 
values by, for instance, enhancing one`s self focus (ask people which values matters the most) 
or to provide cognitive support to activate the value system (ask people to provide a reason 
for their values) (Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  
 From the above literature preview, I draw the assumption that the VBN theory offers a 
good contribution to the explanation on where morality is coming from, and how one could 
explain the process of individual evaluation on environmental risk. As shown in the VBN 
theory (Stern et al. 1999; Stern, 2000), the individual`s moral consideration would originate 
from his/her personal value system. Since the activation of biospheric, altruistic, and egoistic 
values are dependent on situational triggers that are linked to a person’s self-concept and 
supported by cognitive reasons (e.g. damage to the environment or people, or saving money 
by using switching to solar power), these triggers are a subject of interest. Despite this, the 
activation of values might overrun the effect of framing or the perceived causal structure of a 
risk (situational factors), and show of as higher levels of ethic related policy support. This 
would especially be the case for biospheric values (Stern, 2000; De Groot & Steg, 2008). 
Such findings would support the assumption that personal values are crucial in terms of the 
activation of moral responsibility in climate and environmental contexts (Groot and Steg, 
2007). 
 
 Framing.  
 Communication is powerful in the way that it can alter the impact on a recipient`s 
decisions, depending on how the message is framed. Hulme (2009) argues that it is impossible 
21 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION, FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
to present information about climate change without some sort of context, thus making 
framing paramount. Framing, as a concept or area of research, concerns several social science 
disciplines. Frames are “interpretive storylines that set a specific train of thought in motion, 
communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be responsible for it, 
and what should be done about it” (Nisbet, 2009, pp.15). Framing is often used with the aim 
to “trim” information in a way that gives greater weight to certain aspects and elements than 
others, but this is not to be mistaken with telling a lie, or leaving out important information 
(Nisbet, 2009).  
 In the context of climate change, there are many types of empirically different frames 
that are being used (for review see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Examples of framing 
could be outcome framing (based on the prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) or 
attribute framing. The last one implies focusing on a specific aspect, which is commonly used 
in political debates. One example of this is how Republican supporters often emphasize the 
aspect of uncertainty when they talk about climate change (Nisbet & Mooney, 2009). 
Communicators have been using frames like national security, health, and economic 
wellbeing to reach the public awareness about environmental risks, and more recently, as a 
moral issue (Moser, 2010; Wardekker, Petersen, & Van Der Sluijs, 2009). Al Gore`s movie 
‘An inconvenient truth’ or a campaign called ‘What Would Jesus Drive?’ (The Guardian, 
2002) are both examples on framings that aim at motivating people to think about the moral 
aspects of global environmental change. This exemplifies how frames link two concepts (e.g. 
morality and religion) so that people, after exposure to this linkage, accepts this connection 
and use this as a basis for further evaluations and decisions. At the same time, Nisbet (2009) 
stresses that this type of specific frame will be ineffective if it`s not relevant for people`s pre-
existing interpretations. In connection to the example of morality and religion, this probably 
would not be relevant for people who weren`t religious.   
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 The framing of location and responsibility in environmental risks. As previously 
mentioned, people see climate change as a risk that is distant and that have geographically and 
temporally distant impacts for people and places (Leizerowitz, 2005; Räthzel & Uzzell, 2009). 
Swim et al. (2011) argue that the exposure most people tend to have to climate change has 
been very much impersonal, which means that people only have virtual representation through 
movies, documentaries and news media of what may seem like a “remote” area of the world. 
Spence and Pidgeon (2010) use the attribute of “distance” as means to increase personal 
relevance, by arguing that risk communicating should focus on making environmental risk 
“closer”. This includes framing climate change as a proximal and relevant “here-and-now” 
event. When a local focus is highlighted, both an emotional and cognitive engagement will 
arise due to the increased experience of salience (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et 
al., 2007). Rayner and Malone (1997) supports this by claiming that by highlighting local 
impacts of climate change, actions to mitigate it becomes more tangible. The same way in 
which location of a risk is shown to affect risk evaluations, the different framings of 
responsibility are also relevant. The mental model approach by Böhm and Pfister (2001; 
Böhm, 2003) implies that when people evaluate risks to be moral blameworthy (with 
associated feelings and behavioural tendencies), this could be due to framing effects. In an 
experiment done based on their model, the evaluative focus (attention to morality of actions) 
was shown to co-vary with the risk type. When a risk was framed as human caused, (instead 
of naturally) the persuasiveness of morally-based arguments increases (Böhm & Pfister, 
2017).   
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Research aim 
 The aim of the thesis is to use experimental methods to investigate how people`s 
environmental risk perception and following evaluations vary when exposed to different 
frames about the risk. This will be done by using an experimental design to manipulate 
contextual framings in a fictitious environmental risk scenario and thereby measure the 
potential effect on different types of environmentally related policy support. In addition to 
this, a measure of scenario-specific emotions will be included in order to test whether they 
will mediate the relationship between perceptions, cognitive judgements, and behavioural 
tendencies. Furthermore, the use of three distinct value types (biospheric, altruistic, and 
egoistic) will be measured to look at the effect of people`s personal value dispositions on 
policy support.  
  The contextual framings will be manipulated using two types of dimensions: risk 
location and moral responsibility focus. The experiment will manipulate the level location of 
a potential risk, using either: a local or a global focus in a fictitious risk scenario, assuming 
this will induce the feeling of high or low severity. Moral responsibility will be manipulated 
using to types of moral focus: either an individual or a collective moral focus. The policy 
support measurements will differentiate between four different aggression related and four 
different help related policy supports. Here, aggression related policies correspond to morality 
oriented behavioural tendencies, and help related policy supports correspond to consequence 
related behavioural tendencies. This distinction is adopted from the mental model approach by 
Böhm and Pfister (2000; 2005). (See Fig.1). 
 It is reasonable to believe that these conditions will show that a risk scenario framed as 
local with a personal moral responsibility, will elicit morality oriented (aggression related) 
policy support. This expectation is based on previous research showing that a when a risk is 
perceived as a proximal, salient and severe risk (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 
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2007), and to have a clear structure of cause and effect indicating an individual moral 
responsibility (Böhm & Pfister, 2017), this will give rise to more moral thinking. In addition 
to this, it is also rational to believe that morality-oriented emotions will mediate this 
relationship, as it has appeared to be a very strong predictor in environmental risk perception 
and evaluations (Böhm, 2003). Lastly, people`s value dispositions are predicted to influence 
when evaluating policy support.  
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 A pre-test with a student dominated sample (N = 10) was conducted to clarify whether 
the scenarios that were made would be considered plausible and an appropriate manipulation 
for risk severity and moral responsibility in environmental risk scenarios. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the treatments. These treatments were identical to the ones that 
were used in the main study. The only difference was that the participants had to answer 11 
questions after every scenario, aimed at identifying the trustworthiness and appropriateness of 
the scenarios. Examples of questions with open text boxes would be: “What was the text 
about?” and “Do you experience what you just read to be a problem/something risky? (If 
yes/no; why?)”. Examples of questions with a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a large 
extent), are: “While reading the text, I could imagine what was described.”, “The story 
affected me emotionally”, and “I became engaged while reading the text”. Examples of 
questions measuring the manipulation were: “Were does this risk take place? (1 - locally to 7 -
globally), “If anyone, who is responsible for this risk? (The individual (you and me) – the 
community/world`s population – no one)”, and one example with a forced choice question: “If 
you had to choose, who would you say were responsible? 1 (the individual) 2 (the 
community/the world`s population).” A complete list of all the questions is attached in 
Appendix A. Results of the pre-study revealed that the content of both scenarios, and the 
additional questions seemed appropriate to use in a main study. Table 1 shows that those 
individuals who were in the local conditions judged the scenario to happen more on a local 
level than a global level, and vice versa. Table 2 shows that those who got the individual 
condition judged the moral responsibility to be more on the individual than the collective, and 
vice versa.   
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Table 1. 
Group Differences for the Local and Global Condition in the CCS Scenario and Plastic Scenario 
 CCS  Plast 
Location  M SD t(4) p  M SD t(4) p 
Local 5.00 2.74 4.08 .015  5.20 1.30 8.91 .001 




Group Differences for the Individual and collective Condition in the CCS Scenario and Plastic Scenario 
 CCS  Plast 
Responsibility M SD t(4) p  M SD t(4) p 
Individual 1.40 0.54 5.71 .005  1.40 0.54 5.71 .005 




 Participants.  
 The sample consisted of 183 participants, with 63,9% (N = 117) female and 36,1% (N 
= 66) men. 90,7 % (N = 166) of the participants were full-time students and were aged 
between 18 and 42 years, with a mean age of 24 years (SD = 3.3). In the sample, there were 
8,8% (N = 16) who had a full-time job and 17,1% (N = 31) who did not work (either full-time 
or part-time). 43,1% (N = 79) had a high school degree, while 42,6% (N = 78) held a 
Bachelor’s degree, and 13,7% (N = 25) with a Master’s degree. Nearly 75% of the 
participants responded between 1-6 on a 12-point scale, with 0 indicating ‘left wing’ and 12 
‘right wing’. (M = 4.98, SD = 2.37, Range 10) 
 The recruitment of participants was made using an existing pool held by DIGSSCORE 
(The Digital Social Science Core Facility, an infrastructure for social science data collection 
at the University of Bergen), Facebook and personal appeal (mainly at the Faculty of 
Psychology). The DIGSSCORE-pool consisted of about one thousand participants who were 
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mainly students, but with a broad range of study affiliations and educational degrees. As one 
might expect from the recruitment, there are some deviations from the general population, in 
respect to gender, age, and education: young people, females and persons with higher 
educations are overrepresented. 
 
 Design.  
 The two independent variables, risk location and moral focus, were manipulated using 
a 2 x 2 scenario-based design. The scenarios manipulated for (i) risk location, varied on a 
local and global level and in (ii) moral focus, with the two levels: individual and collective. 
This resulted in four different scenarios: 1. A local risk with a focus on collective moral 
responsibility (N= 32), 2. global risk with a focus on collective moral responsibility (N = 53); 
3. A local risk with an individual focus on moral responsibility (N = 52); 4. A global risk with 
a focus on individual moral responsibility (N = 49). 
 Two fictitious scenarios were made, with inspiration from issues that had been 
mentioned in both national, as well as international media. The first scenario was about 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). The text described what CCS is, what the risks associated 
with taking advantage of this technology would be, and what other consequences that could 
occur; both if we used it and if we didn`t. The other scenario was about the problems with 
plastic. It described the great risk of increased plastic in the sea, as well as the danger with 
micro plastic. The two scenarios will be referred to as the CCS scenario and the plastic 
scenario. The two independent variables location and moral focus were varied in the two 
scenarios using the words local/global and individual/collective, but additional adjustments of 
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 Measures.  
 Manipulation check.  
 After reading the scenario, the participants were told to answer where the risk was 
taking place, and who had the moral responsibility. The response category was a forced 
choice between: a local or global level and the individual or the world`s population. This was 
measured twice (once for every scenario exposure), similar to the next two variables 
 Emotions.  
 Emotions were measured using a list of 11 emotions. Four of them were ethic-based 
emotions (anger, contempt, rage, indignation), and five of them were consequence-based 
emotions (sympathy, sadness, fear, worry, sorrow). The last two were resignation-based 
emotions (helplessness, hopelessness). All the emotions were selected based on a factor 
analysis by Böhm and Pfister (2005), as also supported by other studies (Ortony et al., 1988; 
Böhm & Pfister, 2000, Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013). The question asked was: “When you 
think about the scenario you just read, how intensely do you feel…?” The rating scale went 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).  
 
 Policy support.  
 A sample of eight policies were presented for the participants, and for each of them 
they had to indicate to what extent they supported these policies. This was done by using a 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly). The two types of policy support 
measurements were aggression related (e.g. ‘I would boycott products /services involved in 
this issue’) and help related (e.g. ‘To a large extent replace fossil fuels with renewable 
energy’). The aggression related policies correspond to ethical related emotions and 
behavioural tendencies (See Fig. 1), while help related policy support correspond to 
consequence related emotion and behavioural tendencies. The eight policy support 
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measurements were used in both scenarios, with adjustments to fit the context. A complete list 
is included in the questionnaire in Appendix B. The list of policy support measurements was 
selected on basis of the theoretical foundation of moral versus consequence-based outcomes, 
established by Böhm and Pfister (2000), and of material used by Bostrom et al. (2012). 
However, adjustments were made to fit the context.  
 The following variables were only measured once, after the manipulation exposure 
and the measures of policy support and emotions1.  
 
 Values.  
 This measure was meant to represent people`s value orientations. The value scales that 
were used were adopted from De Groot and Steg (2007). Their scale is based on the original 
scale from Schwatz (1992), but with to extra biospheric value items included (because of 
underrepresentation in Schwartz`s original scale). The scale is used to measure three different 
value orientations: egoistic (social power, wealth, authority, influence), altruistic (equality, 
world peace, social justice, helpfulness), and biospheric (preventing pollution, respecting the 
earth, unity with nature, protecting the environment) value orientations. The respondents had 
to indicate on a 9-point scale ranging from -1 (opposed to my values), 0 (not important) to 7 
(extremely important), where they had to consider to what extent each value was “a guiding 
principle in your life” (De Grot & Steg, 2008). In the description (as in the work of Schwartz; 
1977) they were asked to vary their responses, and not to rate more than two values as 
extremely important. The word ‘values’ was not mentioned.  
  
 Demographic items.  
                                               
1 Global citizenship (Reysen, Pierce, Katzarska-Miller & Nesbit, 2013) and moral environmental concern 
(Steentjes et.al, 2017) were also measured, but not further processed in this thesis.   
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 The participants were asked to complete six items regarding their age, gender, student 
status, employment status, and marital status, their highest acquired degree of education, as 
well as their political orientation. Age was answered with an open field, gender had the option 
“man,” “women,” and “other” with the latter including an open field to write in. The student 
status was answered by clicking either “Yes, fulltime,” “Yes, part time” or “No.” The 
following answer options were given to describe their employment status: “Fulltime,” “Part 
time,” “Self-employed (fulltime),” “Self-employed (part time),” “Extra help/call substitute,” 
“Other forms of paid work,” “Currently unemployed,” or “Disability benefits.” The following 
answer options were given to describe their marital status: “Single,” “Boy/girlfriend,” 
“Cohabitant,” “Partnership,” “Married,” “Separated,” “Divorced,” or “Widow/Widower.” To 
answer the question about their highest acquired degree of education, they were given the 
options: “Primary school,” “High school (general specialisation),” “High school 
(occupational),” “Bachelor`s degree,” “Master`s degree,” or “Doctor`s degree.” The last 
demographic measure was meant to give an indication of what political “wing” participants 
sympathised the most with. The question was: “In politics you often hear people talk about 
the ‘left wing’ and the ‘right wing.’ Below is a scale where 0 represents those who stand to 
the far political left, and 10 represent those who stand to the far political right. How would 
you place yourself on such a scale?” The scale ranged from 0 (left) to 10 (right), and was 
translated from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, Wave 7 (2016). 
 
 Procedure 
 The study was run in the DIGSSCORE lab at the university, with groups consisting of 
approximately ten to thirty people. Each participant was randomly assigned to a personal desk 
with a computer, placed in a cubicle that were separated by partition walls placed on the sides 
and the front of each desk. The order of the scenarios was cross balanced. After being 
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presented with general information (how long it would take, that there are no right and wrong 
answers, etc.) from the experiment leader, the participants were presented with the two 
scenarios: either first the plastic scenario and then CCS scenario (N = 93), or the vice versa (N 
= 93).  
 In the introduction, the participants were told to imagine reading the text in a paper, 
and were encouraged to imagine the situations as vivid as possible. After each scenario, the 
manipulations check, emotions, and policy support were measured. The final part of the 
questionnaire consisted of measures of values, global citizenship, moral concern, political 
orientation, and demographic variables. All the dependent variables were randomly presented 
for each participant, and the two scenarios (CCS and plastic) belonged to the same condition 
with respect to both the independent variables ‘location’ and ‘moral focus.’ The reason for 
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Results 
 This section will give an overview of the results from the data analyses.  
Manipulation check 
 To test whether the manipulations in the experiment worked, the four groups (local 
and individual, local and collective, global and individual, or global and collective) were split 
into two dichotomous variables: location and moral focus. An independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the level of experienced moral responsibility in the individual and 
collective conditions. The same was done to compare the level of experienced location in the 
global and local conditions. The test was conducted both for the CCS scenario and the plastic 
scenario. The significance threshold was set at .01. 
 The t-test was found to be statistically significant t(182) = -3.5, p < .001; d = 0.52. The 
effect size for this analysis (d = 0.52) corresponded to Cohen`s convention for medium effect 
(d = .50) (Cohen, 1992). The results indicate that participants in the individual group 
(M=1.33, SD=0.47) judged the moral responsibility to be more on the individual than the 
collective group (M=1.58, SD=0.50), and vice versa. The results also indicate that individuals 
in the local group (M=1.72, SD=0.45) judged the risk to take place on a more local level than 
global level, compared to the global group (M=1.92, SD=0.27). The t-test was found 
statistically significant t(182) = -3.7, p < .001; d = 0.53. The effect size for this analysis (d = 
0.53) was found to correspond to Cohen`s convention for a medium effect (d = .50). 
 For the other scenario, the t-test was also found to be statistically significant, t(182)= -
3.8, p = .001; d = 0.57. The effect size for this analysis (d = 0.57) represents a medium-sized 
effect. These results suggest that the individual group (M=1.56, SD=0.50) also judged the 
moral responsibility to be more on the individual than the collective group (M=1.82, 
SD=0.387). The test also revealed that the local group (M=1.56, SD=0.50) judged the risk to 
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take place on a more local level than global level, compared to the global group (M=1.82, 
SD=0.387). The test was also found to be statistically significant, t(182)= -3.9, p < .001; d = 
0.58. The effect size for this analysis (d = 0.58) represents a medium-sized effect. 
  
Cross balance.  
 To control for order effects, an independent-samples t-test was conducted. There was 
no significant difference in the scores for experienced moral responsibility and the level of 
experienced location, t(182)=958, p > .001, when comparing the (i.) first CCS then plastic (M 
= 1.79, SD = 0.41), and (ii.) first plastic then CCS (M = 1.85, SD = 0.36) conditions. These 




 Policy support.  
 A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of the focus of 
responsibility and the level of location on policy support. All eight policy support 
measurements were entered as dependent variables, while location and moral focus were 
entered as fixed factors. There was found no significant interaction effect between the two 
independent variables (responsibility and location) in either the plastic scenario nor the CCS 
scenario. There were also no significant simple main effects to be found. See Table 3 and 
Table 4. 
  
 Emotions.  
 Like with the latter analysis of policy support, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
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examine the effect of the manipulation of location and moral focus on emotional reactions. 
The three types of emotions (ethical, consequence and resignation based) were entered as 
dependent variables, while location and moral focus were entered as fixed factors. There was 
no significant effect of the two independent variables, nor an interaction effect (See Table 5). 
This gave no reason to proceed looking for a mediation effects.
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Table 3 
 Two-Way (Location and responsibility) Analysis of Variance for the four Aggression Related Policy Support measurements in the CCS scenario and Plastic scenario 
  CCS scenarioc Plastic scenariod 
Dependent variable MS F p MS F p 
Aggression related Support politics that punish polluters       
  Location (loc)a 3.79 2.07 .152 3.78 2.07 .152 
  Responsibility (res)b 1.14 0.62 .431 0.03 0.02 .884 
  Loc x res 1.19 0.65 .420 1.19 0.65 .420 
 Boycott products and services       
  Location 0.48 0.18 .671 0.48 0.18 .671 
  Responsibility  3.89 1.46 .228 1.13 0.62 .431 
  Loc x res 0.87 0.33 .568 0.87 0.33 .568 
 Increase tax on fossil fuels       
  Location  2.17 0.61 .435 2.17 0.61 .435 
  Responsibility  1.86 0.53 .470 3.89 0.53 .470 
  Loc x res 5.06 1.43 .233 5.06 1.43 .233 
 Limit populasjon growth       
  Location  4.57 1.84 .177 4.57 1.84 .177 
  Responsibility  0.11 0.05 .832 0.11 0.53 .470 
  Loc x res 11.13 4.48 .050 11.13 4.48 .036 
abcddf  = 1,180
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 Table 4 
Two-Way (Location and responsibility) Analysis of Variance for the four Help Related Policy Support measurements in the CCS scenario and Plastic scenario 
abcddf  = 1,180
  CCS scenarioc Plastic scenariod 
Dependent variable  MS F p MS F p 
Help related Donate money to environmental org.       
  Locationa 5.71 1.78 .183 5.71 1.79 .183 
  Responsibilityb 5.90 1.85 .176 5.91 1.85 .176 
  Loc x res 0.02 0.01 .939 0.02 0.01 .939 
 Consume and buy less       
  Location  0.68 0.22 .639 0.68 0.22 .639 
  Responsibility  0.78 0.25 .616 0.78 0.25 .616 
  Loc x res 0.94 0.30 .581 0.94 0.31 .581 
 Promote environmental education        
  Location  0.09 0.07 .791 0.09 0.07 .791 
  Responsibility  1.03 0.82 .368 1.03 0.82 .368 
  Loc x res 0.60 0.48 .492 0.60 0.48 .492 
 Replace fossil fuels with renewables       
  Location  0.03 0.02 .884 1.14 0.62 .431 
  Responsibility  0.03 0.03 .874 0.03 .0.03 .874 
  Loc x res 3.60 2.63 .107 3.50 0.48 .107 
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Two-Way (Location and responsibility) Analysis of Variance for the Three Types of Emotional Reactions in the CCS scenario and the Plastic scenario  
 CCS scenario Plastic scenario 
Dependent variable MS F p MS F p 
Ethic related       
 Location (loc) 0.96 0.04a .844 49.78 1.79a .183 
 Responsibility (res) 27.87 1.13a .290 12.75 0.46a .499 
 Loc x res 16.23 0.66a .419 7.20 0.26a .611 
Consequence related       
 Location  8.65 0.22b .643 48.38 1.30c .257 
 Responsibility  58.13 1.45b .230 2.31c 0.06c .804 
 Loc x res 12.79 0.32b .573 2.34 0.06c .803 
Resignation related       
 Location  1.67b 0.17 .679 0.19c 0.02 .884 
 Responsibility  1.06 0.11 .741 14.63 1.67 .198 
 Loc x res 6.40 0.66 .418 4.79 0.55 .461 
adf  = 1,177, bdf = 1,179, cdf = 1,18
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Regressing policy support on emotions and values   
 Based on the findings that indicate that the manipulations in the experiment did not 
have a significant effect on either policy support measurements or emotional response, I 
wanted to proceed with an exploratory approach to try to identify predictors for different 
policy supports. A multiple regression analysis was run to predict the two types of policy 
support (four aggression related and four help related2) from values (biospheric, altruistic and 
egoistic) and scenario-specific emotions (ethical, consequence and resignation based). The 
single items for all the values were aggregated into three groups: altruistic values (α = .65), 
biospheric values (α = .84), and egoistic values (α = .62). This was also done with all the 
single items of emotions: ethic-related emotions (CCS: α = .81, plast: α = .82), resignation-
related emotions (CCS: α = .77, plast: α = .85), and consequence-related emotions (CCS: α = 
.81, plast: α = .80). The analysis was run 8 x 2 times, using one of the eight policy supports 
from each of the two scenarios as dependent variable at the time. The mentioned variables 
were entered as predictors. Preliminary analysis was conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity (Field, 2013). 
The correlation matrix is shown in Appendix C. 
 
 Values and emotions in the CCS scenario.  
 In the CCS scenario the multiple regression model, with all the mentioned predictors, 
significantly predicted all the aggression related policy supports and the help related policy 
supports. For the CCS scenario, the total variance explained for ‘support politics that punish 
polluters’ was 6.5%, F (6, 174) = 3.09, p = .012, for ‘boycott products and services’ it was 
20%, F (6,174) = 8.74, p < .001 , for ‘increase tax on fossil fuels’ is was 22%, F (6, 174) = 
                                               
2 The policy support measurements had not a good enough internal consistency to aggregate into help related and 
aggression related policy supports, showing a range of α = .56 to α = .65 
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9.77, p < .001, for ‘limiting population growth’ it was 6%, F (6, 174) = 3.04, p = .007, for 
‘donate money to environmental organisations’ it was 22%, F (6, 174) = 9.64, p < .001, for 
‘consume and buy less’ it was 34%, F (6, 174) = 16.65, p < .001, for ‘promote environmental 
education’ it was 9,5%, F (6, 174) = 4.15, p = .001, and for ‘replace fossil fuels with 
renewables’ it was 18%, F (6, 174) = 7.61, p < .001.  
 To identify the degree each predictor effected the outcome if the effect of all other 
predictors is held constant, I examined the beta coefficients for each predictor in the CCS 
scenario provided by the regression analysis (See Table 6 and Table 7). The beta values 
showed that biospheric values made a significant contribution to almost every model (both the 
aggression related and the help related policy supports), by contributing with a range from 
17% and 42%. The exceptions were: ‘support politics that punish polluters’ and ‘replace fossil 
fuels with renewables’ (See table 6). In the latter exception (‘replace fossil fuels with 
renewables’), altruistic values made a greater contribution to the model than biospheric 
values. Furthermore, the consequence related emotions, ethical related emotions, and egoistic 
values contributed significantly to predict the model (in addition to biospheric values) for 
support for ‘increase tax for fossil fuels.’ Resignation related emotions contributed more than 
the two latter ones, both of which indicated a negative relationship. This means that when 
ethical related emotions and egoistic values decreases, the support for ‘increase tax for fossil 
fuels’ increases. This negative relationship was also found between altruistic values and 
support for ‘limiting population growth.’ Furthermore, the analysis showed that the support 
for ‘consuming and buying less’ (apart from biospheric values) is significantly due to 
altruistic values, but also ethic related emotions (non-significant). Egoistic values contribute 
with a negative sign, stating that people who have low scores on egoistic values, supports this 
type of policy. In essence, the analysis for the CCS scenario showed that biospheric values 
seem to be the most important predictor when trying to predict why some individuals support 
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some policies more than others. 
 
 Values and emotions in the plastic scenario.  
 In the plastic scenario, the models were also of statistical significance, implying that 
all models successfully could predict all the policy support measurements. For the plastic 
scenario, the total variance explained for ‘support politics that punish polluters’ was a bit 
higher with 17%, F (6, 173) = 5.73, p < .001, compared to the CCS scenario. The rest of the 
coefficients were quite close to the ones in the CCS scenario. For ‘boycott products and 
services’ it was 24%, F (6, 173) = 10.42, p < .001, for ‘increase tax on fossil fuels’ is was 
20%, F (6, 173) = 8.40, p < .001, for ‘limiting population growth’ it was 7%, F (6, 173) = 
3.35, p = .004, for ‘donate money to environmental organisations’ is was 16%, F (6, 173)= 
6.82, p < .001, for ‘consume and buy less’ it was 25%, F (6, 173) = 10.73, p < .001, for 
‘promote environmental education’ it was 13%, F (6, 173) = 5.44, p < .001, and for ‘replace 
fossil fuels with renewables’ it was 15%, F (6, 173) = 6.21, p < .001. 
 To identify to which degree each predictor effected the outcome, if the effect of all 
other predictors are held constant, I examined the beta coefficients for each predictor in the 
plastic scenario provided by the regression analysis (See Table 8 and Table 9). In this 
scenario, the results were much the same as in the CCS scenario. All models showed that the 
biggest significant contribution came from biospheric values (with a range from 19% to 35%), 
except for ‘support politics that punish polluters’ and ‘replace fossil fuels with renewables.’ 
The ‘support politics that punish polluters’ model also showed a large contribution coming 
from ethic related emotions. Like the CCS scenario, egoistic values contributed negatively to 
the prediction of ‘increase tax for fossil fuels.’ Unlike the other scenario, support for ‘boycott 
products and services,’ ‘promote environmental education,’ and ‘replace fossil fuels with 
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renewables’ showed a significant contribution coming from high scores on consequence 
related emotions.
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Regression analysis Summary for Value and Emotion Variables Predicting Aggression Related Policy Support 
Measurements in the CCS scenario.  






Regression analysis Summary for Value and Emotion Variables Predicting Aggression Related Policy Support 
Measurements in the CCS scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
  
 Aggression related policy support 
 Support politics that punish 
polluters 
Boycott products and services Increase tax on fossil fuels Limit population growth 
 Β t p β t p Β t p β t p 
Bios value .13 1.52 .128 .30 3.88 .000*** .32 4.23 .000*** .19 2.23 .023* 
Altru value .08 0.97 .332 .09 1.21 .225 .07 0.94 .346 -.17 -2.12 .035* 
Ego value -.10 -1.40 .164 -.10 -1.60 .109 -.16 -2.40 .023* .14 1.87 .064 
Ethic emo .09 0.94 .349 .12 1.33 .186 -.20 -2.29 .023* .16 1.65 .100 
Resi emo .12 1.32 .830 .01 0.15 .879 .10 1.10 .273 .02 0.17 .861 
Cons emo -.02 -0.21 .189 .09 0.99 .320 .26 2.69 .008** .00 0.03 .977 
 Help related policy support 
 Donate money to env.org Consume and Buy Less Promote Env. Education Replace fossil fuels with 
renewables 
 β t p β t p β t p β t p 
Bios value .34 4.48 .000*** .42 5.90 .000*** .17 2.13 .034* -.07 -0.85 .395 
Altru value .08 1.08 .282 .18 2.68 .008** .08 0.98 .320 .41 5.39 .000*** 
Ego value -.08 -1.14 .254 -.18 -2.94 .004** -.10 -1.38 .168 -.12 -1.57 .118 
Ethic emo .03 0.32 .750 .14 1.77 .078 -.09 -0.99 .322 -.20 -2.19 .030* 
Resi emo .03 0.38 .704 -.02 -.33 .743 .08 0.96 .338 .08 0.92 .358 
Cons emo .15 1.56 .120 -.02 -.26 .794 .18 1.77 .078 .13 1.34 .179 
43 




Regression analysis Summary for Value and Emotion Variables Predicting Aggression Related Policy Support 
Measurements in the Plastic Scenario. 




Regression analysis Summary for Value and Emotion Variables Predicting Help Policy Related Support 
Measurements in the Plastic Scenario. 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 Aggression related policy support 
 Support politics that 
punish polluters 
Boycott products and services Increase tax on fossil fuels Limit population growth 
 β t P β t p β t p β t p 
Value 
bios 
.13 1.62 .107 .31 3.97 .000*** .23 2.87 .005** .22 2.60 .010** 
Value 
altru 
.08 1.04 .299 .13 1.72 .088 .15 1.97 .051 -.16 -1.95 .053 
Value 
ego 





.25 2.73 .007** .04 0.37 .711 .15 1.53 .128 
Emo 
resign 
.09 1.16 .249 .05 0.62 .542 .04 0.55 .585 .14 1.68 .095 
Emo 
conse 
-.03 -0.33 .742 -.06 -0.59 .559 .16 1.62 .107 -,11 -1.10 .272 
 Help related policy support 
 Donate money to env.org Consume and buy less Promote env. Education Replace fossil fuels with 
renewables 
 β t p β t p β t p β t p 
Value 
bios 
.19 2.34 .021* .36 4.73 .000*** .21 2.59 .010** -.04 -0.52 .603 
Value 
altru 
.08 .10 .320 .11 1.52 .129 .02 0.27 .789 .37 4.69 .000*** 
Value 
ego 
-.03 -.48 .628 -.11 -1.71 .089 -.10 -1.47 .144 -.08 -1.18 .238 
Emo  
ethic 
.13 1.40 .164 -.00 -0.02 .987 -.15 -1.51 .133 -.22 -2.29 .023* 
Emo 
resign 
-.08 -1.09 .275 -.00 -0.02 .985 .02 0.25 .803 .03 0.43 .669 
Emo 
conse 
.21 2.15 .033* .15 1.58 .116 .31 3.09 .002** .20 2.05 .042* 
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Discussion 
 The overall objective of the present study was to investigate the effects of location and 
responsibility framings, and the role of emotions and values on environmental risk evaluation 
by measuring policy support. The analyses showed no significant framing effects on policy 
support or emotions, despite at the successful manipulation. Nevertheless, the support for the 
various policies were significantly predicted based on values and emotions. In the following 
section, possible explanations of the null-findings, as well as the exploratory analysis will be 
included in a general discussion in light of relevant theory. It will also present limitations and 
strengths associated with methodology and design, as well as implications and suggestions for 
the direction of future studies. 
 
Manipulation effects 
 Stating that the manipulation check was significant indicates that even though the 
individual participant perceived the scenarios in line with the manipulations (local vs global 
location and individual vs collective moral responsibility), this perception did not 
significantly affect the participants’ evaluations of policy support, nor their emotional 
reactions. The reason for why the experimental manipulation did not have an effect on the 
outcome variables can be for a number of reasons. I will now present a selection of 
explanatory factors that I believe could contribute to explain the outcome of the study.  
 The reason for highlighting the following characteristic of the sample, is the 
possibility of a bias similar to a ‘ceiling effect.’ In statistical terms, a ceiling effect is a 
measurement limitation that happens when the independent variable reaches the highest or 
next to highest level of measure possible, so that the true influence on the dependent variable 
is hard to detect (Salkind, 2010). The rationale behind this assumption in conjunction to the 
findings in the current study is that the effect of the high proportion of young people, students, 
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and women, will altogether make the sample occupied by climate- and environmentally 
relevant issues above average. Further, the effect of the manipulations might, therefore, not be 
significantly effective.  
 As shown in the method section, the sample was somewhat skewed. The sample 
largely consisted of students (<90%), participants that were rather young (Mage = 24), and 
over 50% held either a Bachelor`s degree, a Master`s degree, or a PhD. These demographic 
factors may affect the outcome to a fairly large extent, especially in an environmental relevant 
context. A suggested reason for this could be that (university) students tends to be more 
environmentally lit, concerned, and aware that the average lay person (Van Liere & Dunlap, 
1980), and thereby indicating that higher levels of education have a positive effect on 
environmentalism (Arcury & Christianson, 1990). McMillan, Hoban, Clifford, and Brant 
(1997) also state that younger people are considered less integrated into society, and thus are 
more frequent to criticise governmental and industrial policies. On the other hand, academia 
in general is said to be overrepresented with people with left-wing and liberal orientations. In 
British academics, less than 12% that supports a right-wing or conservative party (Carl, 
2015), and in the US, it is under 10% (Knowles, Holton, & Swanson, 2014). One of the 
explanations for why this is happening is that the longer someone remains in a “biased” 
environment (university), the more likely they are to adopt the philosophy and values of their 
peers or/and professors. This is supported by the fact that the number of left-wing party 
supporters in academia correlates positively with years of higher education (Knowles, Holton, 
& Swanson, 2014). The general explanation for this relationship is that education exposes a 
person to a broad range of ideas and beliefs that might cause a more liberal-minded 
orientation (Milbrath, 1984). 
  In Norway, approximately 57% of the members in the Norwegian Researcher 
Association said they would vote for one of the left-wing parties (Labour party, Red party, 
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Socialist Left Party) at the next parliamentary elections, while 10% would vote for one of the 
right-wing parties (Conservative Party, Progress Party) (Svarstad, 2017). There are some 
informal non-representative surveys among students at educational institutions in Bergen that 
also confirms this as a trend among students in Norway. In one survey, the majority of first-
year students studying subjects like psychology, social studies, and humanities, said they 
would vote for left-wing parties in at the next parliamentary elections in 2017 (Sorge, 2017). 
Note that this was first-year students, and that this would challenge the previous assumption 
that a socialization processes would make people pull one way or another politically, 
especially after a long period of time. The fact that they are first-year students most likely 
indicates that people with a certain type of political orientation and with certain values and 
attitudes are drawn to certain studies. Another point worth highlighting in this context is that 
because so many of the participants were students, under 10% of the sample had a full-time 
job. This may further support the political skewness, while workers may support other 
policies than non-workers. Based on the above findings, the current study could be affected 
by the outcomes due to the sample having an predominance of both young people and non-
working students. 
 In addition to this, considering that nearly 65% of the sample were women may also 
have had an effect. Previous studies state that women tend to report stronger environmental 
attitudes and behaviour than men (McMillan, Hoban, Clifford & Brant, 1997). One study 
showed the same effect across age and across 14 countries (Zelezny, Chua, & Aldrich, 2000). 
Socialization theory would claim that the reason for this is that women are socialized to be 
more caregiving, nurturing, independent, cooperative, helpful, and have stronger “ethic of 
care” (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Chodorow, Rosaldo, & Lamphere, 1974) than men, and 
thereby also more concerned about environmental hazards (Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996). 
Another study also found that women tend to be more environmentally conscious in their 
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consumption intentions than men (Banerjee & McKeage, 1994). In Norway, a representative 
study supports that women, students, and highly educated people overall tend to be more 
concerned for climate change, rank environmental protection as more important than 
economic growth, and highly supports that the Norwegian pension fund should withdrawal 
from coal investments (Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 7, 2016). As a last point, the 
invitation-email promoting the study was named “Invitation to a study about climate and 
environment,” which might have attracted more environmentally conscious people. These 
paragraphs highlight that the results might have been different with a more representative and 
diverse sample, due to the presented biases above.  
 Another aspect that would be reasonable to look at as an explanatory factor for the 
null-findings, is the features of the experimental design. Not only could one argue that the 
types of risks that the scenarios presented could have been different, but also the content and 
the format. Despite the indications from the pilot-study, participants might have found what 
they read neither engaging, relatable, or even reliable. Additionally, as noted by Nisbet 
(2009), a specific type of frame will be ineffective if it`s not relevant for people`s pre-existing 
interpretations. This might be the case here. Additionally, for many people everyday life is 
often full of impressions and stimuli from different technological and non-technological 
sources. This might make the different wordings in a small paragraph about climate change 
insufficient to reach people’s attention and awareness the way that was predicted. A short 
movie or another form of visual stimuli and imagery could have been more effective in this 
context, as also supported by O’Neill and Hulme (2009) and Hulme (2009). A previously 
mentioned study by Harth, Leach, and Kessler (2013) also looked at judgements of scenario-
based environmental risks, but unlike the present study, they used a technique by Neumann 
(2000) to increase the salience of the manipulation. This technique involves getting the 
participants to summarize the content in the scenario they had just read, through performing a 
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so-called sentence-completion task. There could have been an advantage to have used this in 
the present study. 
 Furthermore, if the results were to be interpreted in a way where the somewhat 
skewed sample had no impact, one could argue that a framing effect might be hard to detect in 
studies like the present one. The are several reasons for that, but I will highlight two. First, the 
issue of climate and environmental issues is for most people (at least among people where the 
study was conducted), well known. As a consequence, framing that only involves re-wordings 
will not be a strong enough manipulation to influence or control political support. The present 
results show that (a) people do not differentiate between the severity of environmental risks 
happening “home” and “away,” and that (b) “We” and “I” have the same moral responsibility 
for the same risks. This could then indicate that people might read the scenarios and think of it 
as something risky, negative, and wrong, independent of the different framings. By stating 
that climate and environmental issues is well known and therefore not affected by the 
suggested framings, the counter argument would then be that less known risks would be 
easier to frame and thereby influence peoples action tendencies. My rationale behind this is 
that less known risks are also often less debated and less rigid, and therefore easier to change 
through (re)framing people`s representations (mental models) of the problem. Further, this 
might challenge the view of mental models and framing effects. As a reference to the smoking 
and cancer analogy and mental representations, one could say (based on the current findings) 
that if one’s mental representation of a risk is clear enough, one would not be effected by 
attributional framing effects. One would simply not think that one as an individual do not 
have a moral responsibility for climate change, even if the scenario frames it as a collective 
moral responsibility. The same goes for locality, one would not think that environmental 
issues do not happen on a global level just because the scenario highlights proximity.  
 Second, the effect of political orientation might have overrun the effect of framing in 
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the current study, considering that the action tendency measures may touch upon political 
ideology (e.g. “increase tax in fossil fuel”). Dietz, Dan, and Shwom (2007) looked at people’s 
preferences for climate change mitigation policies and contributing factors, and found great 
support for the effect of political orientation, though indirectly through other variables. Being 
more politically liberal predicted greater environmental trust, through variables concerned 
with people`s values and worldviews. Such findings are also evident in other literature (e.g. 
Dunlap, Wiao, & McCright, 2001).   
 When trying to understand how the manipulation worked in the present study, one 
could also look for contradictory literature of the psychological distance hypothesis on 
geographical proximity. As mentioned in the theory section, several studies suggest that pro 
environmental action tendencies will increase when communicating environmental risks as 
proximal and personally relevant. Nevertheless, other theorists conclude that proximity does 
not promote environmental concern, or at least only under certain conditions (Brügger, 
Dessai, Devine-Wright, Morton, & Pidgeon, 2015). Several studies show that personal risk is 
judged lower than societal risk (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni, 2003; Böhm, 2003), and 
additionally that local problems are viewed as less serious than global environmental 
problems (Uzzell, 2000). This line of argument could have influenced the current study, in the 
way that people might have judged the global risk just as just as serious as (or more serious 
than) the local risk. A suggested reason that if you interpret the CLT theory a bit differently, 
focusing on distance would help people make choices that promote self-control, because the 
choices are more in line with their long-term, abstract, and core personal reflections and 
values (Brügger et al, 2015). Thus, distance could lead to people making more clear 
evaluations and better choices about the future that are more in line with their core values 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). Brügger and colleagues (2015) additionally claim that people who 
hold altruistic and biospheric values would much less be affected by proximity in this context. 
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They say that proximity could decrease those people`s pro-environmental action tendencies 
because their attention gets drawn away from their core values. In line with these arguments, 
framing environmental risks as local in the current study might have made the respondents 
focus less on significant aspects of the risk, which might have resulted in a decrease in overall 
perceived severity of the issue, as a whole. These alternative claims about psychological 
proximity might challenge the assumptions about distance and environmental evaluations 
made in this thesis, as well as provide a deliberate explanation to the null findings.  
 As a last point in the discussion of the lack of framing effects, it is appropriate to 
inform the audience that the current study is suffering from an experimental error. In the 
randomization process, participants were unequally distributed in the four conditions, due to a 
programming error. This might weaken the results due to the conditions not being 
homogenous, which is an important assumption when comparing groups. Despite this, I chose 
to precede because of the relatively large sample size within each condition (N < 30). 
 
 
Exploratory approach  
 When I could not detect a significant effect of the manipulations on the different 
participants` behavioural tendencies, there was no reason to look for following effects on 
people’s emotions. What I did find, was an effect of emotions on policy support. Together 
with values, some emotions (more than others) worked as predictors for the different policy 
supports. Is was also possible to detect a form of pattern, where ethic related emotions were 
better at predicting aggression related policy support, and consequence related emotions better 
at predicting help related policy support. The component model by Böhm and Pfister (2001; 
Böhm, 2003), also shows this connection. This means that when people experience, for 
example, the feelings of anger or outrage, they are more prone to support policies like tax 
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raise and voting for parties that want to punish polluters. Similarly, when experiencing 
consequence related emotions, like guilt and shame, one would be more willing to support 
policies like donating money to environmental organizations or reducing one’s consumption.  
 As shown in the VBN theory, values are also considered strong predictors of pro-
environmental actions. The VBN theory has been used empirically to explain e.g. non-activist 
environmental support (e.g. consumer behaviour or policy support), by posing that these types 
of social movements are rooted in particular human values (Stern et al., 1999). In the light of 
these findings, as well as the present study, this means that when politicians or organizations 
want to promote global environmental change, they must highlight the values (e.g. biospheric, 
egoistic and altruistic values) that are shown to be connected to pro environmental attitudes. 
In addition, they must highlight the threats we face (e.g. sea rise or pollutions in cities) and 
ways to fight the threats (e.g. decrease consumption of fossil fuel), to clarify the causal 
structure (Reese & Jacob, 2015).  
 In summary, the regression analysis suggests that both values and emotions are strong 
predictors for different environmentally related policy supports. In line with previous 
assumptions (Stern et al., 1999; De Groot & Steg, 2007; Böhm, 2003), the current study 
supports the empirical findings that highlights the power of values and emotions in 
conjunction with environment related action tendencies. In conclusion (for both scenarios), 
the selected values and emotions had an explained shared variance of between 6% and 43% 
for the aggression related policy supports, and around 7% to 25% for the help related policy 
supports. The largest explained variance was shown for support for help related policies 
concerning consuming and buying less products and services (in conjunction with the 
scenario). The second largest explained variance was for the aggression related policies 
concerning increasing tax on fossil fuels and boycotting products. In line with previous 
findings, the current results support that biospheric values are the most important values when 
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it comes to predicting environmentally relevant policy support, followed by altruistic values 
and then egoistic values. For the emotions, it seems that ethic related emotions are better at 
predicting aggression related policy support, and that consequence related emotions are better 
at predicting help related policy support (See Table 6 and Table 7). This is in line with the 
findings based on the mental model approach by Böhm and Pfister (2001; 2005; Böhm, 
2003). These findings are of interest because values and emotions have different roots: one is 
a cognitive concept and the other one not. 
  
Theoretical implications 
 The following paragraphs will consider the use of mental models as an approach in the 
context of environmental issues and potential limitations of mental models in light of the 
present findings.  
 As mentioned in the theoretical part, Norman (as sited in Bostrom, 2017) presents four 
elements of mental model research. In the same work, he also puts forward ways to study 
mental models based on these elements. One way would be to investigate people`s mental 
models by comparing it to the conceptual model (element 2). This element could be 
considered the “objective” composition, and therefore a good reference (in e.g. interviews) for 
comparison. Another way would be to investigate and present mental models descriptively. A 
common way of carrying out both these methods is by making use of survey responses. A 
potential challenge within this approach is that it is hard to detect the coherence and 
usefulness of the mental models from the data because of the difficulty of interpreting the 
answers. Another problem is that the participants do not always know how to describe their 
mental models, or that they change their answers due to social desirability bias. Another 
method he mentions is to study mental models using explicit problem solving or decision-
making tasks (Bostrom, 2017).  
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 This range of exploratory methods show that the choice of method in the current study 
could be considered appropriate because it made use of explicit problem decision-making 
tasks. In turn, the potential sources of error (like researcher interpretation) was reduced when 
combining it with framing manipulations. On the other hand, by using scenarios that informed 
the participants about e.g. pros and cons about an environmental risk, there might have been 
interference with the participants existing mental models. A mental model interview about 
CCS or plastic pollution would not have had the interference because it allows respondents to 
express their views without limitations. This is highlighted by the authors of a mental model 
interviews study about CCS, stating that due to the open format (open-end questions) they 
could detect the lack of knowledge and uncertainty related to the theme (Palmgren, Morgan, 
Bruine de Bruin, & Keith, 2004). This type of insight was not detectable in the current study. 
 Despite the methodological precautions for avoiding error, arguments by Norman (as 
sited in Bostrom, 2017) states that people`s mental models can be incomplete, unstable, and 
often neglect details. In addition, they tend to get confused with other mental models or 
similar systems, and have fuzzy boundaries. For example, Leiserowitz and Smith (2010) show 
that people are mixing climate change with the destruction of the ozone layer. Neibert and 
Gropengeisser (2014) on the other hand, suggest that mental models influence how a person 
interprets and makes use of new information, and due to the “stickiness” of mental models, 
people tend to keep their existing mental models and not replace them with new ones (Neibert 
& Gropengeisser, 2014; Moxnes & Assuad, 2012). This has also been proven evident for 
mental models of climate change (Bostrom, 2017). If this “stickiness” of pre-existing mental 
models was the case for the participants in the current study, it could potentially explain why 
the nuances provided by the framing manipulations did not work. 
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Practical implications  
 Based on the current study, the following evidence occurs: (a.) People do not 
differentiate between injustice here and there (local/global), thus making the feeling of 
responsibility for home just as strong as away, and that (b.) “We” and “I” have the same 
moral responsibility (individual/collective) for the environmental risks caused by plastic 
consumption and CCS. These findings have implications for the understanding of the 
conditions for public support for energy transition. These paragraphs will dwell on the 
implications of the findings in relation to the specific scenarios, and about the practical 
implications drawn from the current study for communication campaigns.  
 The scenario about carbon capture and storage (CCS) was presented as objective as 
possible in the current study. Nevertheless, a study by Palmgren and collegaues (2004) shows 
that CCS is perceived by lay persons as a controversial and even less desirable than nuclear 
power when asked to rank the willingness to pay for different technologies (this including a 
selection including solar-, hydro- and wind power, natural gas, energy efficiency, nuclear 
power, geological disposal (CCS on land) and biomass). This indicates that there is strong 
resistance against CCS. Even so, the article concludes by saying that the way the public 
becomes informed about these types of technologies and the way the public debate gets 
framed, both shape the public perceptions about CCS. The current study somehow contradicts 
this by stating that the framing does not matter, and that emotional reactions and personal 
values are the most crucial factors. At the same time, the findings from Palmgren and 
colleagues (2004) could support the heavy influence of the skewed sample.  
 As for the other scenario, plastic pollution is a very different risk compared to CCS, 
and is also involved around a different public discourse, at least in Norway. In April 2017, a 
whale was found dead in the western part of Norway, (probably) due to the plastic found in its 
stomach. This news got international media attention and was highlighted as a visible proof of 
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human`s destructive consumption of plastic (Thompson, Moore, Vom Saal, & Swan, 2009; 
UiB, 2017). Following the argument by Palmgren and colleagues (2004), and the theoretical 
support for framing presented in the theoretical part, the “availability” through the media’s 
attention should have been detectable through significantly different scores on the 
manipulation checks between the different scenarios. As they did not differentiate 
significantly, one could suggest that this supports the general finding in this thesis, that 
framing (e.g. availability, location eca.) in the context of environmental risks, does not seem 
to matter as much as one could think.   
 The scenarios provided in the current study holds a good ecological validity by using 
scenarios that are very diverse, and in addition very similar to what one might read in a 
newspaper or a magazine. It is therefore reasonable to insinuate practical implications of the 
current findings. Examples of both types of framings occurring in news articles in popular 
media or pictures seen in conjunction with demonstrations or street activism (or examples, see 
Appendix D). The types of messages or campaigns that try to communicate an urgency and 
severity of environmental risks by using proximity, and individual morality-based framings, 
could not expect an increased support of ethical related policies, based on the current findings. 
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Conclusions and Future Directions 
 The current study has investigated how people perceive and evaluate environmental 
risk, when framing is manipulated. The implications of the study contribute with empirical 
findings to the field of climate psychology and risk perception in general, but also specifically 
for climate communication. It is important that messages about energy transition and 
hazardous environmental risks (like plastic pollution) are being understood and acted upon. 
Studies like this are important in order to get a better insight in how people understand 
environmental risk, so that we can acquire increased knowledge about how to reach them with 
messages about interventions and measures needed to eliminate harmful environmental 
degradation and greenhouse gas emissions in the future.  
 Based on the literature on mental models, it is tempting to conclude that it is the 
amount of knowledge about climate change and environmental risks and the way it is framed, 
that drive perceptions, evaluations, and behaviour tendencies. But based on the current 
findings and the literature on values and emotions, this assumption seems not to be the case 
(Stern et al. 1999; Stern, 2000, Böhm, 2003, De Groot & Steg, 2007). Instead of assuming 
framing as a decisive factor, the role of personal values and emotions should be taken more 
into account. Because, if policy makers, activists, and the general media follow the 
motivations from the citizens, this could support pro-environmental actions tendencies to a 
much greater extent (Reese & Jacob, 2015). In the end, people support the policy they think is 
most efficient (Bostrom, et.al, 2012). 
 Based on elements from the discussion, an area of improvement for these types of 
studies would be to ensure the representativeness of the sample in order to avoid the potential 
biases. The sample should have a greater proportion of men, elderly, non-students, workers, 
and right-wing oriented participants. The design of the study could be reconsidered in terms 
of the use of stimuli, and be deliberate on the format that is being used.  
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 The fact that environmental issues is much discussed (even in early childhood), and a 
“well-known” theme, contributes to a potential preconditioned frame that one should be 
aware of when trying to look for framing effects. I think the present study supports that the 
public discourse and the media has a powerful effect on shaping people’s mental models and, 
thereby, also environmental risk evaluations. In addition to continuous exploration of this 
challenge through studies, further research should also look into the effect of other personal 
predispositions in conjunction with environmental risk perception and evaluations, using 
similar frameworks to the VBN-theory, but including other types of measurements. 
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 Since the study did not concern any health-related questions or gathered any sensitive 
information from the participants, an application to NSD (Norwegian Centre for Research 
Data) was not considered necessary. In terms of ethical considerations, necessary information 
was given in advance. This included information about confidentiality, rights to withdrawal, 
voluntariness, that there were no right and wrong answers, and a short explanation of the 
purpose and procedure of the study. The participants were also willingly informed about the 
aim of the study when they were paid their incentive after finishing the questionnaire.  
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Appendix A - Pilot study questions 
 
1. Hva handlet teksten om? What was the text about? (tekstbox) 
2. Var det noe du reagerte på I teksten? Was it something that you found odd in the 
text? (tekstbox) 
3. opplever du det du leste som et problem/noe risikofylt? Do you experience what 
you just red to be a problem/something risky? (If yes/no; why?) (tekstbox) 
4. Jeg opplevde teksten som troverdig. I experienced the text as trustworthy. Scale 1 
(not at all) to 7 (to a large extent) 
5. Mens jeg leste teksten kunne jeg forestille meg det som ble beskrevet. While 
reading the text, I could imagine what was described. Scale 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a 
large extent) 
6. Jeg ble engasjert mens jeg leste teksten; I became engaged while reading the text. 
Scale 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a large extent) 
7. Historien påvirket meg følelsesmessig; the story accefted me emotionally. Scale 1 
(not at all) to 7 (to a large extent) 
8. Hvor truende finner du denne situasjoen? How threathening do you find this 
situation? Scale 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a large extent) 
9. Hvor finner denne risikoen sted? Where does this risk take place? 1 (lokalt) til 7 
(globalt) / 1 (locally) to 7 (globally) 
10. Hvis noen; hvem er ansvarlige for denne risikoen? If anyone, who is responsible 
for this risk? (Individet (du og meg) – felleskapet/verdensbefolkningen – ingen) 1-7 
(The individual (you and me) – the community/world`s population – no one) 
11. Hvis du måtte velge, hvem ville du sagt var ansvarlig? If you had to choose, who 
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Appendix B - The main study questionnaire 
 
Start of Block: Intro 
 
Q1 Velkommen!  
 Denne studien er en del av et mastergradsprosjekt for Annika Rødeseike ved Det 
psykologiske fakultet. Hensikten med prosjektet er å få en bedre forståelse av hvordan folk 
tenker rundt ulike klima- og miljøsituasjoner. 
  
 Det finnes ikke noe riktig eller feil svar på spørsmålene. Vi er kun interessert i din personlige 
mening, og dine svar vil forbli anonyme. Hvis du har svart feil, eller vil se spørsmålet igjen 
kan du trykke tilbakepilen. Du vil også kunne følge med på en fremdriftslinje underveis. 
  
 Du er nå klar til å starte. Det vil ta ca. 15-20 minutter å besvare spørsmålene, men du kan 
selvsagt bruke lenger tid. Deltakelsen er frivillig, og du står fritt til å trekke deg fra 
undersøkelsen dersom du ønsker det. 
  
 Deltakelsen din vil bli kompensert med kr 100. 
  
 Vi setter stor pris på at du deltar. Takk for ditt bidrag! 
 
End of Block: Intro 
 
Start of Block: Intro_scenarios 
 
Q76 Du vil nå bli presentert for to ulike scenarioer. Etter at du har lest hvert av dem, vil du 
måtte ta noen avgjørelser. Deretter vil studien fortsette med andre spørsmål.  
 
End of Block: Intro_scenarios 
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Start of Block: CCS_glob_coll 
RANDOMIZATION 
 
Q111 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i 








End of Block: CCS_glob_coll 
 
Start of Block: CCS_glob_ind 
 
Q117 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i 











End of Block: CCS_glob_ind 
 
Start of Block: CCS_loc_coll 
 
Q112 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i 











End of Block: CCS_loc_coll 
 
Start of Block: CCS_loc_ind 
 
Q4 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i den 











End of Block: CCS_loc_ind 
 
Start of Block: Man_check_CCS 
 
Q72 Når du tenker på scenarioet du nettopp leste, hvor vil du si at dette foregår? 
 Lokalt (1) Globalt (2) 






ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION, FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
Q73 Når du tenker på scenarioet du nettopp leste, hvem vil du si har det moralske ansvaret? 
 Individet (1) Verdensbefolkningen (2) 
  (1)  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Man_check_CCS 
 
Start of Block: CCS_emotions 
 
Q105 Når du tenker på scenarioet du nettopp leste, hvor intenst opplever du hver av disse 
spesifikke følelsene? 
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  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Veldig 
sterkt (7) 
Sinne (1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Forrakt (2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Sympati (3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Tristhet (4)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Frykt (5)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Bekymring 
(6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Hjelpesløshet 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Raseri (8)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Sorg (9)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Håpløshet 
(10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Indignasjon 
(11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: CCS_emotions 
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Start of Block: CCS_policy 
 
Q106 Vennligst ta stilling til følgende tiltak, og indiker i hvilken grad du støtter hvert av 
tiltakene.  
78 










Jeg ville stemt på 
et politisk parti 
som vil straffe 
næringslivsaktører 
som benytter CCS 
(f.eks. bøtlegge) 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Jeg ville ha 
boikottet 
produkter/tjenester 




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Øke skatt på all 
fossilt brensel i 
Norge (f.eks. 
bensin, olje, kull) 
(3)  




politikk (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Jeg ville ha donert 
penger til en 
miljøorganisasjon 
som tar ansvar for 
å forhindre denne 
type situasjoner 
(f.eks. lobbierer 
mot CCS) (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Jeg ville ha kjøpt 
og brukt mindre 
tjenester/produkter 
som involverer 
olje (f.eks. fly 
mindre) (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Satse på 
miljøundervisning 
(f.eks. i skolen, på 
jobb) (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I stor grad erstatte 
fossilt brensel med 
fornybar energi 
(8)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: CCS_policy 
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Q24 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i den 








End of Block: Plastic_glob_coll 
 
Start of Block: Plastic_glob_ind 
 
Q23 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i den 











End of Block: Plastic_glob_ind 
 
Start of Block: Plastic_loc_coll 
 
Q22 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i den 











End of Block: Plastic_loc_coll 
 
Start of Block: Plastic_local_ind 
 
Q20 Vennligst forestill deg at du leser følgende tekst i en avis. Prøv å sette deg godt inn i den 











End of Block: Plastic_local_ind 
 
Start of Block: man_check_plastic 
 
Q119 Når du tenker på scenarioet du nettopp leste, hvor vil du si at dette foregår? 
 Lokalt (1) Globalt (2) 





Q120 Når du tenker på scenarioet du nettopp leste, hvem vil du si har det moralske ansvaret? 
 Individet (1) Verdensbefolkningen (2) 
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End of Block: man_check_plastic 
 
Start of Block: Plastic_Emotion_ratings 
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  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Veldig 
sterkt (7) 
Sinne (1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Forrakt (2)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Sympati (3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Tristhet (4)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Frykt (5)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Bekymring 
(6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Hjelpesløshet 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Raseri (8)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Sorg (9)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Håpløshet 
(10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Indignasjon 
(11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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End of Block: Plastic_Emotion_ratings 
 
Start of Block: Plastic_policy 
 
 
Q36 Vennligst ta stilling til følgende tiltak, og indiker i hvilken grad du støtter hvert av 
tiltakene.  
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Jeg ville stemt på 
et politisk parti 





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Jeg ville ha 
boikottet 
produkter/tjenester 




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Øke skatt på all 
fossilt brensel i 
Norge (f.eks. 
bensin, olje, kull) 
(3)  




politikk (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Jeg ville ha donert 
penger til en 
miljøorganisasjon 
som tar ansvar for 
å forhindre denne 
type situasjoner 
(f.eks. plukker 
plast langs kysten) 
(5)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Jeg ville kjøpt og 
brukt mindre 
produkter som er 
laget av eller 
inneholder 
mikroplast (f.eks. 
treningsklær) (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Satse på 
miljøundervisning 
(f.eks. i skolen, på 
jobb) (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I stor grad erstatte 
fossilt brensel med 
fornybar energi 
(8)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Plastic_policy 
 
Start of Block: Glob_cit 
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  (1)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Glob_cit 
 
Start of Block: moral 
 
Q18 Noen mennesker har moralske bekymringer om miljø- og klimaendringer. For eksempel 
fordi de tror at det er mest sannsynlig at de skadelige virkningene vil påvirke fattige land, 
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eller fordi de føler et moralsk ansvar overfor kommende generasjoner. I hvor stor grad har du 



















o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
End of Block: moral 
Start of Block: Values 
Q37  
Vi vil nå stille deg noen spørsmål som har til hensikt å undersøke hvilke faktorer som er 
viktige i livet ditt. Det er ikke noen svar som er "riktig" eller "galt". Informasjonen vil bli 
behandlet konfidensielt. 
  
 Det vil bli beskrevet 13 aspekter, hvor forklaringer for disse er gitt i parentes. Her skal du 
angi i hvor stor grad hver av disse aspektene fungerer som en rettesnor i livet ditt. 
  
Dette betyr tallene: 
 0 betyr at aspektet ikke er viktig i det hele tatt, og ikke fungerer som en guide for deg. 
 3 betyr at aspeket er viktig. 
 6 betyr at aspektet er svært viktig. 
 -1 tilsier at aspektet er uforenlig med prinsipper som er veiledende for deg i livet ditt. 
 7 tilsier at aspektet er av største betydning for deg som veiledende i livet ditt (vanligvis er 
det ikke mer enn to slike aspektvurderinger). 
 Desto høyere tall (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), desto større er viktigheten av hvert aspekt som en 
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veileder i LIVET DITT. Prøv å skille så mye som mulig på dem, gjennom å bruke forskjellige 
tall.  
 
Q38 Vennligst angi i hvor stor grad hver av disse verdiene fungerer som en rettesnor i livet 
ditt. 
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0 (2) 1 (3) 2 (4) 3 (5) 4 (6) 5 (7) 6 (8) 7 (9) 
LIKESTILLING (like 
muligheter for alle) (1)  o o o o o o o o o 
RESPEKT FOR JORDEN 
(Harmoni med andre arter) 
(2)  
o o o o o o o o o 
SOSIAL MAKT (kontroll 
over andre, sosial 
dominans) (3)  
o o o o o o o o o 
SAMHØRIGHET MED 
NATUREN (være "i ett" 
en med naturen) (4)  
o o o o o o o o o 
VARIG FRED I VERDEN 
(fra krig og konflikter) (5)  o o o o o o o o o 
VELSTAND (materiell 
eiendom, penger) (6)  o o o o o o o o o 
AUTORITET (å lede 
andre med rett til å 
bestemme) (7)  
o o o o o o o o o 
SOSIAL 
RETTFERDIGHET 
(motarbeide ulikheter i 
samfunnet, omsorg for de 
svake) (8)  
o o o o o o o o o 
BESKYTTE MILJØET 
(naturvern) (9)  o o o o o o o o o 
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INNFLYTELSE (ha 
innflytelse på andre 
mennesker og være i stand 
til å påvirke hva som skjer) 
(10)  
o o o o o o o o o 
HJELPSOMHET (for å 
jobbe for andres trivsel) 
(11)  
o o o o o o o o o 
MOTVIRKE 
MILJØFORURENSING 
(beskytte de naturlige 
ressursene) (12)  




o o o o o o o o o 
 
 
End of Block: Values 
 
Start of Block: left_right_wing 
 
Q39 I politikken snakker man ofte om "venstresiden" og "høyresiden". Nedenfor er en skala 
der 0 representerer de som står helt til venstre politisk, og 10 representerer de som står helt til 
høyre politisk.  
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  (1)  o  o o o o o o o o o o o  
 
 
End of Block: left_right_wing 
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o Kvinne  (1)  
o Mann  (2)  
o Andre (spesifisèr)  (3) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q42 Er du for tiden student? 
o Ja, fulltid  (1)  
o Ja, deltid  (2)  
o Nei  (3)  
 
Q43 Hvilken av de følgende beskriver best ditt arbeidsforhold  
o Fulltid  (1)  
o Deltid  (2)  
o Selvstendig næringsdrivende (heltid)  (3)  
o Selvstendig næringsdrivende (deltid)  (4)  
o Ekstrahjelp/ringevikar  (5)  
o Andre former for betalt arbeid  (6)  
o For øyeblikket arbeidsledig  (7)  
o Uføretrygdet  (8)  
 
Q42 Hva er din sivile status? 
o Singel  (1)  
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o Kjæreste  (2)  
o Samboer  (3)  
o Partnerskap  (4)  
o Gift  (5)  
o Separert  (6)  
o Skilt  (7)  
o Enke/enkemann  (8)  
 
 
Q43 Hva er din høyest oppnådde utdanningsgrad? 
o Grunnskoleutdanning (1.-10.)  (1)  
o Vidergående (studiespesialiserende)  (2)  
o Vidergående (yrkesfag)  (3)  
o Bachelorgrad  (4)  
o Mastergrad  (5)  
o Doktorgrad  (6)  
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Appendix C - Correlation matrix from regression analysis  
Table 10. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Support politics that Punish Polluters 
and Emotion, Value and Manipulation Check Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 11. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Boycott Products and Services and 
Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Support politics that punish polluters 3.59 1.66 .215** .18** -.119** .18** 0,18** .15** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Boycott products and services 3.77 1.82 .42*** .29*** -.13* .29*** .20** .29*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
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Table 12. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Increase Tax on Fossil Fuels and 
Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 13. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Limit Population Growth and Emotion 
and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Increase tax on fossil fuels 5.08 1.80 .40*** .28*** -.18** .11* .22** .29*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Limit population growth 2.04 1.57 .16* -.06* .13* .20* .09* .13* 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
99 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK EVALUATION, FRAMING EFFECTS 
 
Table 14. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Donate Money to Environmental 
Organisations and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS  
scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 15. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Consume and Buy Less and Emotion 
and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Donate money to envir. 
org 
3.72 1.88 .45*** .29*** -.09* .26*** 0.23** .32*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Consume and buy less 4.82 1.86 .54*** .39*** -.22** .28*** .15** .23** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
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Table 16. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Promote Environmental Education 
and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 17. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Replace Fossil Fuels with Renewables 
and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the CCS scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Promote environmental 
Education 
6.10 1.22 .27*** .22** -.11* .13* .20** .25*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Replace fossil fuels with 
renewables 
6.42 .983 .12* .41*** -.12* -.02* .14* .15* 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.25 5.58 - .45*** -.08* .32*** .22** .33*** 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.39 .45*** - -.03* .19** .22* .32* 
3. Ego values 23.35 5.47 -.08* -.03* - .06** -.01** .07** 
4. Ethic values 12.54 4.96 .32*** .19** .06* - .47*** .64*** 
5. Resig values 8.70 3.07 .22** .22** -.01* .47*** - .55*** 
6. Conseq velues 20.39 6.28 .33*** .32*** .07* .64*** .55*** - 
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Table 18. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Support Politics that punish Polluters 
and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Table 19. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Boycott Products and Services and 
Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 
 






Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Support politics that punish 
polluters 
5.85 1.35 .27*** .21** -.08* .33*** .22** .26*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Boycott products and services 5,01 1,63 .44*** .31*** -.08* .35*** .21** .28*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
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Table 20. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Increase tax on Fossil Fuels and 
Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario  




Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Limit Population Growth and Emotion 
and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Increase tax on fossil fuels 4.94 1.87 .39*** .31*** -.15* .24*** .19** .31*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Limit population growth 2.09 1.60 .18** -.03* .10* .18** .18** .09* 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
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Table 22. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Donate Money to Environmental 
Organisations and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 




Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Consume and Buy Less and Emotion 
and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario. 
 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Donate money to envir. 
org 
4.64 1.80 .33**’ .23** -.03* .32*** .12* .36*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Consume and buy less 5.16 1.75 .48*** .32*** -.13* .23** .16* .31*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
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Table 24. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Promote Environmental Education 
and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 
 




Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Replace Fossil Fuels with Renewables 
and Emotion and Value Predictor Variables in the Plastic Scenario 
*p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
  
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Promote environmental 
Education 
6.20 1.12 .30*** .18** -.12* .13* .13* .29*** 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Replace fossil fuels with 
renewables 
6.23 1.17 .13* .36*** -.10* -.01* .08* .14* 
Predictor variable         
1. Bios values 25.26 5.59 - .45*** -.08* .35*** .25*** .39* 
2. Altru values 29.14 4.40 .45*** - -.03* .22** .21** .30*** 
3. Ego values 23.37 5.48 -.08* -.03* - .11* .05* .04* 
4. Ethic values 16.17 5.25 .35*** .22** .11* - .41*** .68*** 
5. Resig values 8.80 2.95 .25*** .21** .05* .41*** - .43*** 
6. Conseq velues 24.01 6.08 .39*** .30*** .04* .68*** .43*** - 
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Figure 3. Campaign from Catholic Relief Service, 2016 (http://www.conversationsmagazine.org/web-




Figure 4.  Campaign from Greenpeace, 2016 (https://simpleandinteresting.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/14.jpg) 
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Figure 6.. From Catholic Relief Service, 2016 (http://www.conversationsmagazine.org/web-features/2016/10/21/cry-of-the-
earth-cry-of-the-poor-laudato-si-and-jesuit-higher-education ) ©2017 Catholic Relief Services 
